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Rhode Island’s Prescription Drug
Database: Warrantless Searches by
Law Enforcement Pass Constitutional
Muster
Stephen D. Lapatin*
INTRODUCTION

The opioid epidemic in Rhode Island is the most urgent public
health crisis of our generation.1 The opioid crisis originated in the
late 1990s when pharmaceutical companies assured doctors that
their patients would not become addicted to prescription opioids.2
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of
Law, 2019. Thank you to Professor Colleen P. Murphy, Nicole Rohr, Tyler
Bischoff and the Roger Williams University Law Review Editorial Board for
their invaluable guidance throughout the writing process.
1. Overdose Prevention and Intervention Task Force, R.I. OFF.
GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.ri.gov/initiatives/odtaskforce/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2018).
2. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis
(last
updated Mar. 2018); Opioid Overdose: Prescribing Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/
prescribing.html (last updated Aug. 30, 2017); Rhode Island’s Strategic Plan
on Addiction and Overdose: Four Strategies to Alter the Course of an
Epidemic, R.I. GOVERNOR’S OVERDOSE PREVENTION & INTERVENTION TASK
FORCE
3
(2015),
health.ri.gov/news/temp/RhodeIslandsStrategicPlan
OnAddictionAndOverdose.pdf. (“The two main driving forces behind this
increase were regulatory pressures encouraging more opioid prescribing, and
unscrupulous practices by some in the pharmaceutical industry.”).
Nationwide, a total of 214,881,622 opioid prescriptions were dispensed by
retail pharmacies in 2016. CDC, Annual Surveillance Report of Drug-Related
Risks and Outcomes, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTIONS 9 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drug-surveillance-
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Consequently, opioid prescribing rates increased dramatically,
resulting in widespread diversion and misuse.3
Despite state-wide efforts to combat the opioid epidemic,
opioid addiction continues to tighten its grip on Rhode Islanders.4
In 2014, Rhode Island established a prescription drug monitoring
database (PDMP), which contains prescription information for
every Schedule II–V drug that is prescribed.5 Rhode Island’s
PDMP has proven to be an important mechanism in the fight
against the opioid crisis, as it “helps to prevent over-prescribing
and promotes better coordination among healthcare providers
throughout the state.”6 Additionally, the PDMP is a tool for law
enforcement to detect overprescribing, diversion, or fraud related
to prescription opioids.7 Under the 2014 PDMP law, law
enforcement officials were required to obtain a warrant pursuant
to probable cause in order to access PDMP
information.8
However, the warrant requirement was repealed in 2017, making
it easier for law enforcement to access PDMP information.9
report.pdf.
3. Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 2. A study conducted by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that in about a quarter of
all United States counties, enough opioids were prescribed in 2016 for every
person to have one. U.S. Prescribing Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html
(last updated July 31, 2017).
4. Overdose
Death
Data,
PREVENT
OVERDOSE
RI,
http://preventoverdoseri.org/overdose-deaths/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018)
[hereinafter Overdose Death Data]. From 2011 to 2016, overdose deaths
increased by more than ninety percent in Rhode Island. Id.
5. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32 (Supp. 2017). Most states have
implemented various forms of PDMPs, which monitor the prescribing and
dispensing of Schedule II–V controlled substances to prevent improper or
illegal use of controlled substances. What States Need to Know about PDMPs,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
drugoverdose/pdmp/states.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2017).
6. Press Release, R.I. Dep’t of Health, RI Achieves 100% Enrollment in
Prescription
Drug
Monitoring
Program
(Sept.
29,
2016),
http://www.ri.gov/press/view/28654 (quoting current Rhode Island State
Governor Gina M. Raimondo). The PDMP serves to “identify unusual or
aberrant patterns of prescribing controlled substances, by relevant
prescribing attributes.” 21 § 21-28-3.32(n)(3)(ii).
7. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, Mission, R.I. DEP’T HEALTH,
http://health.ri.gov/programs/detail.php?pgm_id=156/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2018) [hereinafter Prescription Drug Monitoring Program].
8. § 21-28-3.32(a)(4). See H.B. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan Sess. (R.I. 2014).
9. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5). Compare H.B. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan Sess. (R.I.
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Effective January 1, 2018, the 2017 Rhode Island law
authorizes law enforcement officials within the Medicaid Fraud
and Patient Abuse Unit (MFPAU) in the Office of the Rhode
Island Attorney General (RIAG) to access PDMP information
without a warrant.10 While this is the current law, there will
likely be constitutional challenges, as previewed during the
legislative process in 2017 when the Rhode Island General
Assembly considered the elimination of the warrant
requirement.11 At that time, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and over twenty medical associations strongly opposed
the bill.12 During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the
then-proposed law, a representative testifying on behalf of various
medical associations in Rhode Island argued that a warrantless
search of the PDMP is unconstitutional and a gross invasion of
privacy rights.13 Moreover, the ACLU stated, “[i]f police wanted
to search the medicine cabinet in your home, they would need a
warrant,” and “[t]he fact that the medicine cabinet is stored
electronically shouldn’t change that equation.”14 On the other
hand, the RIAG strongly advocated in favor of the proposed law,
arguing that the law is not only constitutional, but also necessary
because the warrant requirement under the 2014 law significantly
hampered investigations into “pill-mills” and over-prescribing
2014) (requiring a warrant for all law enforcement) with H.B. 5469, 2017
Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017) (requiring no warrant for “a department employee
to a certified law enforcement prescription drug diversion investigator of a
qualified law enforcement agency for use in an investigation”).
10. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5).
11. Organizations Ask Governor to Veto Bill Allowing Law Enforcement
Access to
PDMP Without Warrant, ACLU (July 17, 2017),
http://www.riaclu.org/news/post/organizations-ask-governor-to-veto-billallowing-law-enformcement-access-to.
12. Id. Medical associations that were opposed to warrantless searches
of the PDMP included, among others, the Rhode Island Medical Society, the
Hospital Association of Rhode Island, the Mental Health Association of Rhode
Island, the Rhode Island Academy of Physician Assistants, and the Rhode
Island Health Center Association. Opposed to Warrantless Search of
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, R.I. MED. SOC’Y, http://riaclu.org/
images/uploads/PDMP_Supporting_Groups.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
13. An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg.,
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
14. Organizations Ask Governor to Veto Bill Allowing Law Enforcement
Access to PDMP Without Warrant, supra note 11.
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physicians.15 Likewise, Governor Gina Raimondo described the
law as one more “tool in the toolbox against the criminal networks
that prey on Rhode Islanders who have become addicted to
prescription drugs.”16 Ultimately, the Rhode Island General
Assembly agreed with Governor Raimondo and the RIAG,
repealing the warrant requirement before law enforcement can
access PDMP information.17
It is well-settled that under the Fourth Amendment, “a
warrant is required––subject to well-delineated exceptions––for
any government intrusion into an area in which an individual
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy.”18 In light of this
privacy concern, the 2017 Rhode Island law was one of the most
highly contested pieces of legislation in the 2017 legislative
session. Beyond Rhode Island, Fourth Amendment challenges to
laws authorizing warrantless searches of state-PDMPs have
begun to emerge throughout the country.19 The ACLU challenged
laws similar to that of Rhode Island in Utah and Oregon; it has
taken cases as high as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.20 However, the constitutionality of laws permitting
warrantless searches of PDMPs remains largely unsettled across
all jurisdictions.
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of the 2017
Rhode Island law from the perspective of patients and medical
personnel in the context of the warrant requirement under the

15. An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg.,
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017) (statement of Matthew Lenz, R.I. Att’y Gen.).
16. See Katherine Gregg, Raimondo Signs Bill Allowing Warrantless
Searches of R.I. Drug Database, PROVIDENCE J. (July 19, 2017, 7:12 PM),
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170719/raimondo-signs-billallowing-warrantless-searches-of-ri-drug-database.
17. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(5) (Supp. 2017).
18. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
19.
See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. ACLU, 860 F.3d
1228 (9th Cir. 2017); United States D.O.J. v. Utah Dep’t of Com., No. 2:16CV-611-DN-DBP, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1 (D. Utah Jul. 27, 2017).
20.
See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 860 F.3d at 1228,
1231 (“The ACLU . . . argu[ed] that the DEA’s use of subpoenas violate[d]
their Fourth Amendment rights. They sought declaratory and injunctive
relief prohibiting the DEA from obtaining prescription records from the
PDMP without a warrant supported by probable cause.”); Utah Dep’t of Com.,
WL 3189868, at *1.
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Fourth Amendment. This Comment will argue that the law does
not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Part I will begin by discussing Rhode Island’s
PDMP law prior to 2017 and proceed to examine the legislature’s
fight against the opioid epidemic that led to the 2017 law
authorizing law enforcement to access the PDMP without a
warrant. Part II will address constitutional issues pertaining to
the 2017 law, beginning by analyzing the constitutionality of the
law from the perspective of patients and will examine whether
they retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
prescription information contained in the PDMP. In addition, this
Part will examine the constitutionality of the law from the
perspective of medical personnel and its applicability to the
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this
Part will conclude that the 2017 law is constitutional because
patients do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
prescription information and searching a prescribing medical
professional’s prescription records is an administrative search,
which is an exception to the warrant requirement.
I.

RHODE ISLAND’S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO ITS OPIOID CRISIS

The 2017 Rhode Island law discarded the warrant
requirement contained in the PDMP law for certain law
enforcement officials.21 Since creating the PDMP in 2014, the
Rhode Island General Assembly has passed numerous laws aimed
at combatting the opioid crisis.22 Despite those efforts, it is
evident the legislature remains concerned about the state of the
opioid crisis in Rhode Island, as illustrated by the enactment of
the 2017 Rhode Island law. This part will examine the PDMP law
prior to 2017 and the changes implemented through the
enactment of the 2017 Rhode Island law.
A. Rhode Island Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Prior to
2017
In 2014, Rhode Island created a statewide PDMP maintained
21. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5).
22. See, e.g., H.B. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2523, 2014
Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2823 (R.I. 2016); S.B. 2946, 2016 Leg., Jan.
Sess. (R.I. 2016); H.R. 5469, 2017 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
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by the Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDOH).23 The
PDMP collects, monitors, and analyzes electronically transmitted
prescribing and dispensing data submitted by medical
practitioners and pharmacies.24 All licensed physicians and
pharmacists are required to register with the PDMP and report to
the database every Schedule II–V prescription that they issue
within one business day.25
Since 2016, Rhode Island has required prescribing physicians
and pharmacists to review the PDMP prior to prescribing or
dispensing opioids to protect against patients seeking
prescriptions for illegitimate medical reasons.26 Studies have
shown that this requirement has been effective in combatting the
opioid crisis.27 For example, a 2010 study found that when the
PDMP was reviewed prior to issuing a prescription, emergency
room physicians altered their patient’s opioid prescriptions in
forty-one percent of cases.28 Moreover, sixty-one percent of
patients received fewer opioid pain medications than had been
previously planned by the physicians prior to reviewing the
PDMP, with the physician sometimes choosing not to prescribe an
opioid at all.29
Information reported to the PDMP includes basic information,
such as the patient’s name and prescription details, along with the
prescribing physician and pharmacist information.30 Prior to
23.
§ 21-28-3.32(a). The summary of the bill that created the PDMP
stated: “This act would require the director of the department of health, after
appropriate notice and hearing, to promulgate rules and regulations for the
purpose of adopting a system for electronic data transmission of prescriptions
for controlled substances.” H.B. 5756, 2013 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013).
24.
See Miles D. Schreiner, A Deadly Combination: The Legal Response
to America’s Prescription Drug Epidemic, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 529, 535 (2012).
25. §§ 21-28-3.18(n), -3.32(l).
26.
Id. § 21-28-3.20(b). “The prescription-monitoring program shall be
reviewed prior to starting any opioid.” Id.
27.
See David F. Baehren et al., A Statewide Prescription Monitoring
Program Affects Emergency Department Prescribing Behaviors, 56 ANNALS OF
EMERGENCY MED. 19, 21–22 (2010).
28.
Id. at 21.
29.
Id.
30.
§ 21-28-3.32(b); see also R.I. DEP’T HEALTH, DATA SUBMISSION
DISPENSE GUIDE RHODE ISLAND PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM (RI
PDMP) 24–25, 31 (2016), http://go.appriss.com/rs/768-UPQ-075/images/
RI%20PDMP%20AWARxE%20Dispenser%20Guide.pdf [hereinafter RIDOH
DATA SUBMISSION DISPENSE GUIDE] (specifying the information required by
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2017, access to this information was limited to certain medical
professionals, medical boards, and pharmacists to assist in the
treatment of their patients, in addition to law enforcement
officials “[p]ursuant to a valid search warrant based on probable
cause to believe a violation of federal or state criminal law ha[d]
occurred and that specified information contained in the database
would assist in the investigation of the crime.”31
All fifty states have some version of a PDMP to monitor the
prescribing and dispensing of opioids. According to the United
States Supreme Court, the collection of prescription information
in prescription databases is a reasonable exercise of a state’s
broad police powers and does not violate the United States
Constitution; however, the Court has not yet spoken to whether a
valid search warrant is required for state law enforcement officials
to search the database.32
B. The 2017 Rhode Island Law Allowing Law Enforcement
Access to Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Information
Without a Warrant
In 2017, Rhode Island passed a law allowing law enforcement
to access the state’s PDMP without a warrant.33 Specifically, the
2017 Rhode Island law allows for disclosure of PDMP information
“[b]y a [RIDOH] employee to a certified law enforcement
prescription drug diversion investigator of a qualified law
enforcement agency for use in an investigation.”34 More
Rhode Island when submitting records to the RI PDMP).
31. § 21-28-3.32(a).
32. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598, 602 (1977) (“Requiring
such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the
health of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.”).
33. See S.B. 0656aaa, 2017 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
34. § 21-28-3.32; see also id. § 21-28-1.02(5) (“‘Certified law enforcement
prescription drug diversion investigator’ means a certified law enforcement
officer assigned by his or her qualified law enforcement agency to investigate
prescription drug diversion.”); § 21-28-1.02(41) (“‘Qualified law enforcement
agency’ means the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Inspector General
of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, or the Medicaid Fraud
and Patient Abuse Unit in the Office of the Attorney General.”); Katherine
Gregg, Advocates urge veto of bill to open prescription drug database for law
enforcement, PROVIDENCE J. (July 17, 2017), http://www.providence
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specifically, warrantless access is limited to certified law
enforcement officials, including those “within the Medicaid Fraud
and Patient Abuse Unit [MFPAU] in the Office of the [Rhode
Island] Attorney General.”35 The RIAG argued that the warrant
requirement under the 2014 law significantly handicapped its
investigative abilities regarding illicit opioid use, and therefore,
the 2017 Rhode Island law was necessary to further the state’s
fight against the opioid epidemic.36
Notably, the 2017 Rhode Island law does not provide
unfettered access to Rhode Islanders’ prescription information.37
As a prerequisite, the law enforcement officials within MFPAU
must first complete a certification course approved by the state.38
Then, when PDMP information is sought, certified law
enforcement officials are required to submit a written verification
to the RIDOH, averring that the PDMP information sought is in
furtherance of an active investigation.39 Additionally, the RIAG is
required to submit “quarterly reports of the data received by all
certified
law
enforcement
prescription
drug
diversion
investigators in the qualified law enforcement agency,” containing
journal.com/news/20170717/advocates-urge-veto-of-bill-to-open-prescriptiondrug-database-for-law-enforcement (“The access would apply to the . . .
Medicaid Fraud and Patient Abuse Unit in the state attorney general’s
office.”).
35. § 21-28-1.02(41).
The Medicaid Fraud and Patient Abuse Unit enforces the laws
pertaining to fraud in the state Medicaid program and prosecutes
cases of abuse, neglect or mistreatment of patients in all state
healthcare facilities. The Unit prosecutes criminal activity, pursues
civil remedies where appropriate and participates with federal and
state authorities in a variety of inter-agency investigations and
administrative proceedings.
Unit
prosecutors,
auditors,
investigators and health care professionals employ a multidisciplinary approach to combat health care fraud and patient abuse.
Medicaid Fraud and Patient Abuse Unit, R.I. OFF. ATT’Y GEN.,
http://www.riag.ri.gov/CriminalUnit/MedicaidFraudPatientAbuseUnit.php
(last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
36.
See An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg.
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
37.
“No person shall access information in the prescription-monitoringdatabase except to the extent and for the purposes authorized.” § 21-283.32(i).
38. See id. § 21-28-1.02(5).
39. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(ii)(A).
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written verification that the requests were part of lawful
investigations, and a brief description of each case closed during
that quarter that used PDMP information.40 If the requirements
set forth in the law are not satisfied, the RIDOH can strip access
to PDMP records from state law enforcement officials.41
C. The 2017 Rhode Island Law Does Not Violate the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act or the Rhode Island
Constitution
The 2017 Rhode Island law is consistent with the Federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and
the Rhode Island Constitution. Opponents of laws permitting
warrantless searches of prescription records argue that the laws
violate HIPAA privacy protections.42 This concern was raised
before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the 2017 Rhode
Island law, where one opponent argued that prescription records
are “some of the most highly protected information that a person
can have.”43 While this argument may seem compelling at first
glance, warrantless searches of the PDMP do not fall within the
scope of HIPAA protections, which will be discussed in the
40. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(ii).
41. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(v). This section reads as follows:
Failure to submit a verification form under subsection (5)(iv) of this
section shall result in the immediate suspension of disclosure of
information from the database by the department to the qualified
law enforcement agency and its certified law enforcement
prescription drug diversion investigators until determination is
made by the department to allow continued disclosure.
Id.
42. Nathan Freed Wessler, The DEA Thinks You Have “No
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest” in Your Confidential Prescription
Records, AM. C.L. UNION (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity/dea-thinks-you-have-no-constitutionally-protected-privacy-interestyour (“The Drug Enforcement Administration thinks people have ‘no
constitutionally protected privacy interest’ in their confidential prescription
records, according to a brief filed last month in federal court.
That
disconcerting statement comes in response to an ACLU lawsuit challenging
the DEA’s practice of obtaining private medical information without a
warrant. The ACLU has just filed its response brief, explaining to the court
why the DEA’s position is both startling and wrong.”).
43. See An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg.
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017) (statement of Patrick Quinlan).
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following section.
Moreover, it is well established that states can afford greater
protections under state constitutions than those provided by the
United States Constitution.44 However, the Rhode
Island
Supreme Court has declined to extend protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures beyond Fourth Amendment
precedent established by the United States Supreme Court.45
1.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

HIPAA contains a Privacy Rule that establishes national
standards to protect individuals’ medical records and other
protected health information.46 The Privacy Rule applies to the
use and disclosure of private health information by “covered
entities” and “business associates.”47 Although prescription
information may emanate from covered entities, a PDMP is
neither a “covered entity” nor a “business associate” within the
meaning of HIPAA, and, thus, warrantless access to the PDMP
does not fall within the scope of HIPAA protections.48 Regardless,
the Privacy Rule permits covered entities to disclose protected
health information, such as prescription records, to law
enforcement without the individual’s written authorization upon
submission of a written request by law enforcement.49 As a
result, the 2017 Rhode Island law is not inconsistent with HIPAA
44. See, e.g., State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997).
45. See id.
46. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2018).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). HIPAA defines covered entities as health
care providers, health plans (health insurers and HMOs), and health care
clearinghouses. Id. Health care providers include hospitals, physicians, and
other caregivers, as well as researchers who provide health care and receive,
access, or generate individually identifiable health care information. Id.
Pharmacists and pharmacies are also HIPAA covered entities. Id. A
business associate is any person or organization that creates, receives,
maintains or transmits protected health information on behalf of a covered
entity. Id.
48. NAT’L ALL. FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS & SARA L. GREEN &
ASSOCIATES, LLC, PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS (PMPS) AND
THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA), 1–3
(Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.namsdl.org/library/ED56718E-A683-22AAFDEE3CD77BE925DE/.
49. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) (2017).
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because it does not fall within the scope of the Act.
2.

Rhode Island Constitution

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized its power to
afford greater protections to its citizens under the Rhode Island
Constitution.50 It held in State v. Bjerke, however, that “[t]he
decision to depart from minimum standards and to increase the
level of protection should be made guardedly and should be
supported by a principled rationale.”51 The Rhode Island
Constitution does not provide additional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures than those guaranteed under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.52
Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has concluded that
“the Fourth Amendment provides ample protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and state courts should
respect the manner in which it is interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.”53 As such, the proceeding section will focus on
issues arising under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution pertaining to the 2017 Rhode Island law.
II. THE 2017 RHODE ISLAND LAW AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The 2017 Rhode Island law raises constitutional issues. For
example, when law enforcement officials access PDMP
information pursuant to the 2017 Rhode Island law for the
purpose of investigating a prescriber or pharmacist for illicit
activity, patients who received treatment from that prescriber or
pharmacist inevitably will have their prescription information
turned over to law enforcement as well.54 Therefore, physicians’
constitutional privacy right in the records they keep and patients’
50.
State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997) (quoting State v.
Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980)) (internal quotations omitted).
51.
Id.
52.
See id. The Rhode Island Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, papers and possessions, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6.
53.
State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992); see also Bjerke, 697
A.2d at 1073 (stating that the court recognizes its power to afford greater
protections under the R.I. Constitution, but declined to do so).
54. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32 (Supp. 2017).
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constitutional privacy right in their prescription information are
potentially violated by the 2017 Rhode Island law. This part
argues that the 2017 Rhode Island law does not violate the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, patients do
not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription
information contained in the PDMP; and second, as to prescribing
physicians and pharmacists, warrantless searches by law
enforcement of prescription records reported to the PDMP fall into
the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.
Constitutional implications that may arise differ for patients
and prescribing physicians. Although patients do not own the
records reported to the PDMP, they could have a right to privacy
under the Fourth Amendment if those patients retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription
information.55 If the patients do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their prescription information contained
in the PDMP, then Fourth Amendment protections do not apply,
and law enforcement officials do not have to obtain a warrant to
access the database.56 On the other hand, in Rhode Island, all
medical records are the property of the physician who created the
medical records.57 As such, medical records reported to the PDMP
are commercial property of the reporting physicians, which is
covered by the Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the
warrant requirement applies––such as the administrative search
exception that arguably applies here.58
A. Patients Do Not Retain a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Prescription Information Reported to the PDMP
Assume that a patient in Rhode Island has been charged with

55.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people––and not simply ‘areas’––against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .”).
56.
Id.
57.
§ 5-37-22(g) (“Unless otherwise expressly stated in writing by the
medical practice group, all medical records shall be the property of the
medical practice group with which a physician is associated when that
physician created all such medical records.”).
58.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354; see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
699 (1987) (stating that the protection against unreasonable searches or
seizures extends to commercial property).
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a criminal offense stemming from evidence obtained through a
warrantless search of his or her prescription information
contained in the PDMP. Subsequently, the patient challenges the
constitutionality of the 2017 Rhode Island law that authorized law
enforcement officials to obtain that information without a
warrant––a scenario that may be a reality in the not-so-distant
future. In order to prevail, the patient would have to prove that
he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
prescription information contained in the PDMP.59 To make that
determination, the United States Supreme Court employs a twoprong test: first, whether the individual has exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the search; and secondly,
whether that subjective expectation of privacy is one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.60 If a reasonable
expectation of privacy does not exist, then the Fourth Amendment
protections do not apply and warrantless searches are allowed.61
The last time the United States Supreme Court interpreted
the right to privacy in prescription information was in Whalen v.
Roe, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New
York law that required patients’ prescription information to be
reported to a centralized database.62 The Court admitted that, as
a starting point, a reasonable expectation of privacy in
prescription information exists.63 Specifically, two different kinds
59.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
60.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In
Smith, regarding the first prong, the Court stated that the inquiry rests on,
“whether . . . the individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve [something]
as private.’” 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361) (alteration in
original). In addition, regarding the second prong, the Smith Court stated
that the determination turns on whether the individual’s expectation, viewed
objectively, is justifiable under the circumstances. Id.
61.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (“[T]his Court uniformly has held that
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”); see
also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)
(“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment––subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”) (internal quotations omitted).
62. 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
63. Id. at 599–600.
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of privacy interests are implicated by a state-run prescription
database: “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.”64 In upholding the
constitutionality of the law, the Court stated:
[N]either the immediate nor the threatened impact of the
patient-identification requirements in the New York
State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 on either the
reputation or the independence of patients for whom
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to
constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.65
The Court reasoned that requiring prescription information to be
provided to government officials who are responsible for public
health and safety, “does not automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy.”66
Courts have differed as to the extent of patients’ limited
privacy interest recognized in Whalen.67 Although Whalen upheld
the constitutionality of state-run PDMPs, the Court did not
address patients’ reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining
warrantless searches by law enforcement officials.68 Nonetheless,
since patients do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
prescription information that is reported to the PDMP, one may
argue that the warrant requirement is never triggered and,
therefore, a warrantless search would not result in a Fourth
Amendment violation. In contrast, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Douglas v. Dobbs, found that
64. Id.
65. Id. at 603–04.
66. Id. at 602.
67.
See Kathleen A. Ward, A Dose of Reality: The Prescription for a
Limited Constitutional Right to Privacy in Pharaceutical Records is
Examined in Douglas v. Dobbs, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 73, 76 (2008)
(“Although courts have acknowledged a privacy right exists in
pharmaceutical records, the magnitude of this right has not been completely
defined.”).
68.
“The constitutional question presented is whether the State of New
York may record, in a centralized computer file, the names and addresses of
all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s prescription, certain
drugs for which there is both a lawful and unlawful market.” Whalen, 429
U.S. at 591.
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patients do retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
prescription records.69 The court, relying on the privacy interests
recognized in Whalen, concluded that a patient’s interest in
avoiding disclosure included law enforcement officials and not
merely disclosure to the general public because prescription
records may contain information regarding other medical
conditions.70
State courts that have interpreted Whalen have found that a
patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy extends to protection
against public disclosure, but it does not extend to prescription
information obtained by law enforcement officials.71 For example,
the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that patients do not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription information
obtained by law enforcement.72 In State v. Russo,
law
enforcement officers, obtained a patient’s prescription records
without a warrant pursuant to state law.73 The court reasoned
that the privacy protection recognized in Whalen was only an
expectation that a patient’s prescription records will not be
disseminated to the general public.74 Moreover, it stated that “the
[Whalen] court drew no distinction between the patients’ rights
vis-à-vis the investigators, on the one hand, and the patients’
rights vis-a-vis the regulatory personnel of the New York
department of health, on the other hand.”75 Thus, the Russo court
extended Whalen from mere reporting of a patient’s information to
a database to warrantless searches by law enforcement officers.76
69. 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698 (Neb. 2013); State v.
Russo, 790 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 2002); State v. Stow, 593 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio
1992).
72. Russo, 790 A.2d at 1152–53.
73.
Id. at 1141–42 (“General Statutes § 21a-265 broadly provides that
prescription records shall be ‘open for inspection . . . to federal, state, county
and municipal officers, whose duty it is to enforce the [federal and state drug
laws].’”) (alterations in original).
74.
See id. at 1143.
75. Id. at 1153.
76.
In response to the patient’s argument that although an individual
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his or her
prescription records in the context of searches by regulatory personnel, an
individual does have such an expectation of privacy in the context of
inspections by law enforcement personnel, the court stated: “Both the dictates
of Whalen and common sense compel this court to reject the defendant’s claim
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Similarly, in State v. Stow, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a
patient’s right to privacy in prescription records extends only to
disclosure of information to the general public.77 The court held
that the mere threat of unauthorized disclosure to the general
public was not enough to render a law permitting warrantless
searches unconstitutional.78 Moreover, the Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless search by law
enforcement because the request was safeguarded by any further
dissemination of those records.79
Turning now to the 2017 Rhode Island law, the weight of the
case law suggests that patients do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their prescription information contained
in Rhode Island’s PDMP. The 2017 Rhode Island law does not
follow the Douglas line of reasoning, which states that patients
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription records
because they are inherently private and might contain facts about
other medical conditions.80 The Douglas court expressly stated
that a patient has a right to privacy in preventing disclosure of
prescription records by government officials but failed to
acknowledge the fact that police officers are also government
officials.81 Befittingly, the court failed to address whether the
prescription records at issue in the case actually contained such
information, only finding that “prescription records . . . may reveal
other facts about what illnesses a person has . . . .”82 Regardless,
prescription information reported to the Rhode Island PDMP does
not include facts pertaining to a patient’s medical conditions: it
contains only the patient’s basic information and prescription
that any such distinction is constitutionally significant.” Id. at 1153.
77.
593 N.E.2d 294, 299 (Ohio 1992) (“After finding that no significant
threat is presented to [the patient’s] right of privacy, we follow the lead of the
Whalen court.”).
78.
Id.
79.
State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698, 709 (Neb. 2013). “Weighing the
State’s significant interest in the regulation of potentially dangerous and
addictive narcotic drugs against the minimal interference with one’s ability to
make medical decisions and the protections from broader dissemination to
the general public, we find the State did not violate [the patient’s] . . . privacy
rights through its warrantless, investigatory access to [the patient’s]
prescription records.” Id. at 206.
80. Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005).
81. See id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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information.83
The 2017 Rhode Island law is similarly consistent with the
interpretation of a patient’s right to privacy delineated in
Whalen.84 As previously stated, the 2017 Rhode Island law
adequately safeguards against disclosure of prescription
information to the general public by allowing only the MFPAU––
responsible for public health and safety––to obtain PDMP records
upon submission of written verification to the RIDOH.85 The
2017 Rhode Island law expressly prohibits disclosure of PDMP
information to unauthorized personnel and vests the RIDOH with
the ability to strip access to PDMP information upon noncompliance with the law, adequately safeguarding against the
possibility of disclosure.86
Thus, because patients do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their prescription information contained in the
PDMP, a warrantless search of the PDMP by law enforcement
pursuant to the 2017 Rhode Island law would not trigger the
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Fourth Amendment Issues Pertaining to Prescribing
Physicians and Pharmacists: The Administrative Search Exception
to the Warrant Requirement
Assume that a Rhode Island law enforcement official searched
PDMP records without a warrant pursuant to an investigation of
a doctor, who is now charged with a criminal offense stemming
from illegal prescribing practices. The doctor challenges the
constitutionality of the 2017 Rhode Island law authorizing the
officer to conduct the warrantless search, arguing that the search
was unconstitutional because the prescription records that were
reported to the PDMP are the commercial property of his or her
medical practice, and therefore protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches conducted outside
the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable––subject to only a

83.
84.
85.
86.

See RIDOH DATA SUBMISSION DISPENSE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 25.
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(iv) (Supp. 2017).
Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(v).
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few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”87
One of those exceptions is the administrative search exception,
which involves those situations where the government conducts a
search of commercial property pursuant to a regulatory scheme.88
The Fourth Amendment extends to commercial property, but
greater latitude is afforded to warrantless searches of commercial
property because the privacy rights that individuals enjoy in those
contexts differs from the privacy right to one’s home or person.
Specifically, “that this privacy interest [in commercial property]
may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by
regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections.”89
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether a
search of a PDMP by law enforcement officials is an
administrative search. Nonetheless, a search must meet three
requirements to fall within the administrative search exception to
the warrant requirement.90 First, the warrantless search must be
one that is designed to enforce a regulatory scheme and not
merely for the purpose of collecting criminal evidence.91 Second,
the warrantless search must be in the context of a “pervasively
regulated industry.”92 Finally, the warrantless search must be
reasonable.93 Reasonableness is determined using a three-part
test: (1) the regulatory scheme must further a “substantial”
government interest; (2) warrantless inspections must be
necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory
scheme must be a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant.94
87.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
88.
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Ann K. Wooster,
Annotation, Validity of Warrantless Administrative Inspection of Business
that is Allegedly Closely or Pervasively Regulated, 182 A.L.R. Fed. § 2[a]
(2002); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative
Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 259 (2011) (“[T]he government has
increasingly relied on administrative search doctrine to justify its actions.”).
89.
Wooster, supra note 88, at § 2[a]; see Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312–13 (1978).
90.
See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–05.
91.
Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (quoting
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)).
92.
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.

544 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:526
1. A Warrantless Search Authorized Under the 2017 Rhode
Island Law is Designed to Enforce an Administrative Scheme
To determine if a warrantless search falls into the
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement, the
first step is to conclude whether the warrantless search is
designed to enforce a regulatory scheme and not solely for the
purpose of collecting criminal evidence.95 The United States
Supreme Court in Los Angeles v. Patel considered whether
warrantless searches of hotel records by law enforcement officers
was an administrative search.96 The contested code provision
compelled hotel operators to keep a record containing specific
information concerning guests, and to make the record available
to police for inspection on demand.97 The Court found that,
although the exception to the warrant requirement did not
ultimately apply, the authorized warrantless search was an
administrative search because it served a “special need” other
than conducting criminal investigations.98 The special need was
to ensure compliance with the recordkeeping requirement, “which
in turn deters criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”99
Furthermore, in New York v. Burger, the United States Supreme
Court held that a warrantless search of a junkyard by a police
officer was constitutional.100 The Court concluded that an
administrative search pursuant to a regulatory scheme is not
unconstitutional “simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an
inspecting officer may discover evidence of crimes . . . .”101 Thus,
it is clear that a warrantless search may be conducted by law
enforcement personnel for both administrative and penal purposes
and still fall within the meaning of an administrative search.102
The Vermont Supreme Court relied on Burger in finding that
95. Id.
96. 135 S. Ct. at 2448.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2452.
99. Id. The code provision was struck down on other grounds because it
failed to provide hotel operators with an opportunity for pre-compliance
review. Id. at 2451.
100. 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987).
101. Id. at 716.
102. See id. at 717 (“[W]e fail to see any constitutional significance in the
fact that police officers, rather than ‘administrative’ agents, are permitted to
conduct the . . . inspection.”).
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a warrantless search of pharmacy records by a police officer was
an administrative search.103 In that case, State v. Welch, the
police officer acted pursuant to a Vermont law that required
pertinent records to be open to state law enforcement officials who
were responsible for enforcing narcotics laws.104 The court held
that the police officer’s inspection was within his enforcement
powers, which allowed him to search the pharmacy records in
furtherance of a criminal investigation.105
Under the 2017 Rhode Island law, warrantless searches of the
PDMP serve as an additional piece to the well-established and
long-standing regulatory scheme of prescription drug regulation
and reporting in the state.106 The PDMP fosters communication
among health professionals in order to better treat their patients
and provides prescribers with information that is conducive to
making informed prescribing decisions.107 Beyond that, the
PDMP is a tool used by law enforcement to detect illegal activities
by physicians, pharmacists, and patients.108 Therefore, the 2017
Rhode Island law is consistent with the Burger line of reasoning
because it serves administrative and penal purposes.109
2. The Prescription Drug Industry in Rhode Island is Pervasively
Regulated
Regarding the administrative search exception, the United
States Supreme Court employs a two-part test to determine if an
industry has a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) the industry
must be comprehensively regulated; and (2) the industry must
pose an inherently clear and significant risk to public welfare.110
103. State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Vt. 1992).
104. Id. at 1111.
105. Id. at 1113.
106. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32 (Supp. 2017).
107.
See id. § 21-28-3.32(m). The prescribing practitioner shall review the
prescription-monitoring program prior to refilling or initiating an opioid. See
id. § 21-28-3.32(m); Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, supra note 7.
108.
See Press Release, Governor Gina Raimondo, RI Achieves 100%
Enrollment in Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.ri.gov/press/view/28654.
109. See § 21-28-3.32(a)(1)–(2), (5).
110.
Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2005). However, the
United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that the
administrative search exception is inapplicable to a warrantless search that
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Based on the nature of pervasively regulated industries, an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of
those industries is lessened.111 Because of that, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that “no reasonable expectation of
privacy . . . could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an
enterprise.”112
Despite numerous lower court decisions, the United States
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the prescription drug
industry is pervasively regulated for purposes of the
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.113
Regarding industries other than the prescription drug industry,
the Court characterized pervasively regulated industries as those
with such a history of comprehensive government regulation that
a reasonable expectation of privacy could not exist for a proprietor
over information produced and maintained within the context of
that industry.114
Lower courts have held that the pharmaceutical industry is
comprehensively regulated for purposes of the administrative
search exception.115 Notably, in United States v. Gonsalves, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit analyzed
whether the prescription drug industry in Rhode Island is

is not within the context of a pervasively regulated industry. Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d
532, 542 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the drug-manufacturing industry,
which had a long history of supervision and inspection, was within the class
of closely regulated businesses that could be searched without a warrant
without violating the Fourth Amendment); U.S. ex. Rel. Terraciano v.
Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 685 (2nd Cir. 1974) (holding that searching a
licensed pharmacist’s records related to narcotics and stimulant or
depressant drugs that were maintained on the premises did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); see also Costantini v. Medical Bd. of Cal., No. 93–16926,
1994 WL 419924, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 1994) (unpublished table decision)
(holding that a search of pharmaceutical and patient records of a principal
officer of a weight-loss clinic fell within the administrative search exception
to the Fourth Amendment).
114.
Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2454 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313 (1978)).
115.
United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2006); United
States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1982); United States D.O.J. v.
Utah Dep’t of Com., No. 2:16-cv-611-DN-DBP, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1, *9 (D.
Utah Jul. 27, 2017).
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pervasively regulated.116 In Gonsalves, pursuant to a search
warrant, law enforcement officers conducted a search of patient
prescription records located in a doctor’s office.117 The court held
that:
In Rhode Island, as under federal law and in other states,
drugs are heavily regulated in storage and dispensation
and have been for many years. . . . Rhode Island’s Food,
Drugs, and Cosmetics Act has been in effect for a halfcentury . . . and the pertinent provisions are numerous,
longstanding and pervasive. The scheme readily passes
the “closely regulated” test of Burger.118
Since Gonsalves, Rhode Island has continued to regulate the
prescription drug industry, passing numerous laws pertaining to
the PDMP since it was established in 2014.119 For example, since
2016, prescribers have been required to inform patients of the
existence of the PDMP, and are required to report prescription
information to the PDMP within one business day.120
In addition to being comprehensively regulated, the
prescription drug industry in Rhode Island must pose a significant
risk to the public welfare in order to qualify for the administrative
exception.121 In Patel, the United States Supreme Court held that
the hotel industry was not pervasively regulated because “nothing
inherent in the operation of hotels poses a clear and significant
risk to the public welfare.”122 Such a statement, however, cannot
be made in regard to prescription opioids. The prescription drug
industry, unlike hotels, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of pervasively regulated industries because it poses
a clear and significant risk to public welfare, illustrated by the
numerous laws passed by Rhode Island in response to the opioid
crisis.123
116.
Gonsalves, 435 F.3d at 67.
117.
Id. at 66.
118.
Id. at 67 (internal citations omitted).
119. See H.R. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2523, 2014
Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2823, 2016 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2016); S.B
2946, 2016 Sess. (R.I. 2016); H.R. 5469, 2017 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
120. S.B. 2823, 2016 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2016).
121. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015).
122. Id.
123. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
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Therefore, the 2017 Rhode Island law satisfies the two-part
test for pervasively regulated industries because the prescription
drug industry in Rhode Island is comprehensively regulated and
poses a clear and significant risk to public welfare.
3. Warrantless Searches by Law Enforcement of the PDMP
Under the 2017 Rhode Island Law are Reasonable
An administrative search within a pervasively regulated
industry must be reasonable under the three Burger
requirements.124 The test for reasonableness differs from the
Katz two-prong test because an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is significantly lessened in the context of a
pervasively regulated industry.125 In the context
of
administrative searches: (1)the regulatory scheme must further a
“substantial” government interest; (2) warrantless inspections
must be “necessary to further the regulatory scheme”; and (3) the
“inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its
application,” is a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant.”126 Although the United States Supreme Court has not
analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless searches of PDMPs,
numerous state courts have applied the three-part Burger
analysis to laws similar to that of the 2017 Rhode Island law.127
a. The PDMP is a Regulatory Scheme that Furthers a
Substantial Government Interest
Courts have recognized that the government has a substantial
interest in regulating areas that pose a threat to public welfare.128
prescription opioid abuse is a health epidemic. Joanna Shepherd, Combating
the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescription Drug Reporting
Program, 40 AM. J. L. & MED. 85, 86 (2014); see also Overdose Death Data,
supra note 4.
124.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); see also State v.
Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1111 (R.I. 1992).
125.
See Welch, 624 A.2d at 1111.
126.
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
600, 602 (1981)).
127.
See, e.g., State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 2002); State v. Stow,
593 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio 1992); State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1992).
128.
States such as Vermont, Connecticut, and Ohio have all recognized a
strong government interest in the regulation of prescription drugs. See
Russo, 790 A.2d at 1155; Stow, 593, N.E.2d at 300; Welch, 624 A.2d at 1111.
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For example, in Burger, the United States Supreme Court found
that New York had a substantial government interest in
regulating the junkyard industry because the high rate of motor
vehicle thefts were causing a significant economic burden on
citizens.129 Additionally, regarding warrantless searches
of
mining facilities, the Court stated: “[I]t is undisputed that there is
a substantial [government] interest in improving the health and
safety conditions in the Nation’s underground and surface mines
. . . the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the
country . . . .”130
The PDMP furthers a substantial government interest in
regulating opioids because the over-prescribing of opioids, which
often leads to overdose deaths, can be addressed by regulating and
controlling the prescription drug industry through the PDMP.
Beyond crime, Rhode Island’s opioid problem negatively affects its
citizens at an increasing rate, and the medical and prescription
drug industries are directly associated with this problem.131 The
2017 Rhode Island law ensures that all prescribing physicians and
dispensing pharmacists make informed decisions while treating
their patients because, under its requirements, physicians and
pharmacists must consult the PDMP prior to prescribing an
opioid.132 Absent the PDMP, it would be significantly more
difficult to prosecute over-prescribing doctors, “pill-mill”
pharmacies, and opioid-abusing patients. The PDMP allows
government officials to monitor state-wide opioid use and track
down bad actors. Therefore, it is difficult to deny that Rhode
Island’s PDMP law furthers an important governmental interest
in combatting the opioid crisis in the state.
b. Warrantless Searches of Rhode Island’s PDMP Are Necessary
to Further the Regulatory Scheme
Turning to the second Burger requirement, warrantless
129.
Burger, 482 U.S. at 708.
130.
Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311, 315 (1972) (concluding regulation of firearms to prevent crime furthered
a substantial government interest).
131.
C.f. Burger, 482 U.S. at 708 (concluding that the high rate of vehicle
theft in New York was a major societal problem that placed enormous
economic and personal burdens on its citizens).
132. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(m) (Supp. 2017).
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searches must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.133
In this context, the United States Supreme Court has often
deferred to determinations made by the legislature. For example,
in Donovan, the Court deferred to the legislature’s decision to
authorize warrantless searches of mining facilities, stating: “[I]f
an inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent,
unannounced, even frequent inspections are essential. In this
context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate
inspection.”134 Likewise, the Vermont Supreme Court deferred to
the legislature’s determination that warrantless searches are
necessary to effectuate the deterrent effect of prescription drug
regulations.135
Looking to the 2017 Rhode Island law, the Rhode Island
General Assembly determined that it was necessary to discard the
warrant requirement for PDMP searches. The RIAG expressly
stated that warrantless searches are necessary to further the
effectiveness of the PDMP.136 The RIAG further stated a warrant
requirement significantly hampers its ability to investigate “pillmills” and doctor-shopping patients.137 On the other side,
representatives from the ACLU and various medical associates
testified in strong opposition to the then-proposed law before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.138 The Rhode Island General
Assembly had ample evidence to make an informed decision
regarding warrantless access by law enforcement to PDMP
information. Thus, a court deferring to the legislature would find
that a law authorizing warrantless searches of Rhode Island’s
PDMP is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of prescription drug
regulations.

133. Burger, 419 U.S. at 702.
134. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603 (quoting Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316)
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
135. State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1112 (Vt. 1992) (quoting Burger, 482
U.S. at 710).
136. See An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg.
Sess. (R.I. 2017).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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c. The PDMP Regulatory Scheme is a Constitutionally Adequate
Substitute for a Warrant
Under the third Burger requirement, in order to be considered
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, the law must
perform the two basic functions of a warrant: (1) it must advise
the owner that the search is being made pursuant to the law and
has a properly defined scope; and (2) it must limit the discretion of
the inspecting officers and have a properly defined scope.139
Regarding the first prong, the Vermont Supreme Court in
Stow stated, “the inspection scheme provides an adequate
substitute for a warrant, because these provisions are ‘sufficiently
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property
cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to
periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.’”140 Under
the 2017 Rhode Island law, prescribers are sufficiently notified
that a search is being made in accordance with the law because all
prescribers in Rhode Island are required to register with the
PDMP in order to obtain a prescribing license.141 Moreover, the
bottom of the PDMP registration form has a separate section
pertaining to the PDMP’s functions and requirements.142 Thus,
prescribing physicians and pharmacists have knowledge of their
record-keeping obligations and are aware that inspections of
prescription records in the PDMP may occur.
In addition, the scope of the Rhode Island law is narrowly
tailored––only authorizing the MFPAU to conduct warrantless
searches of the PDMP upon submission of a written request to the
RIDOH.143 The United States Supreme Court in
Patel
determined that a municipal ordinance allowing warrantless
searches of hotel records was too broad because it failed
“sufficiently to constrain police officers’ discretion as to which
139. Burger, 482 U.S. at 711.
140. Stow, 593 N.E.2d at 300–01.
141.
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, supra note 7. In response to
the crisis, Rhode Island Governor Raimondo stated: “Achieving 100%
enrollment in our [PDMP] is an important milestone, and we will continue to
set the bar high to ensure that providers on the frontlines of Rhode Island’s
overdose crisis are actively using the system to keep their patients safe.”
Gov. Gina Raimondo, supra note 108.
142.
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, supra note 7.
143. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(m) (Supp. 2017).
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hotels to search and under what circumstances.”144 On the other
hand, the court in Welch found that a regulatory scheme
authorizing warrantless searches was narrowly tailored because it
limited warrantless inspections to certain law enforcement
officers.145 Therefore, the 2017 Rhode Island law is consistent
with the Vermont Supreme Court’s line of reasoning.
Furthermore, the 2017 Rhode Island law requires that the request
for PDMP information be pursuant to an active investigation and
does not allow unfettered access to prescription records.146 The
time, place, and scope of the Rhode Island law is sufficiently
limited to serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant.
In conclusion, the 2017 Rhode Island law satisfies the
requirements of the administrative search exception delineated by
the United States Supreme Court. As a result, warrantless
searches of the PDMP by law enforcement do not violate the
constitutional rights of the prescribers whose records are obtained
pursuant to the 2017 Rhode Island law.
CONCLUSION

Rhode Island lawmakers are faced with an epidemic that
continues to pose a serious risk to the welfare of the state. The
2017 Rhode Island law strikes a balance between protecting the
privacy of prescription information and providing law enforcement
officials with effective tools to combat the opioid epidemic in
Rhode Island. This Comment has shown that the privacy
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are not triggered
by warrantless searches of Rhode Island’s PDMP. The 2017
Rhode Island law will help solve the opioid crisis and will
withstand constitutional challenges brought under the Fourth
Amendment.

144. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2456 (2015).
145. State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1112 (Vt. 1992). Regarding the third
prong, the court also stated: “Pharmacists may not dispense drugs without
obtaining a license and this necessarily implies knowledge of their recordkeeping obligations.” Id.
146. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5).

